The Payback Plan & The Ameri-Share Tax Proposal

A Framework for Middle-Class Renewal, Fiscal Security, and America’s Future

Thomas Allen Moon

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America does not face one isolated problem. It faces a convergence of long-developing pressures: large structural federal deficits, rising interest costs, an aging population, the financing needs of Social Security and Medicare, rapid technological change, the displacement and devaluation of ordinary skills by globalization, automation, and artificial intelligence, and a concentration of income and wealth that has left many middle-class families less secure than headline economic statistics suggest. None of these developments, standing alone, ensures national decline.

Together, however, they create a challenge that becomes harder and more expensive the longer the country waits. The Payback Plan begins from a simple premise: America should confront these pressures while it still has room to choose, rather than after financial markets, Social Security and Medicare financing shortfalls, or political crisis narrow those choices. I have long believed that it is better to light a candle than curse the darkness. The Payback Plan is my effort to light one. I began this work years ago in my book, Payback: Why the Top 1% Must Invest in the Rest and How It Can Renew America.

Payback asked a question that has only grown more important: what happens to a constitutional capitalist society when a large part of its middle class becomes economically insecure, pessimistic about mobility, and doubtful that the system works for them? The answer matters to far more than the middle class. It matters to everyone who owns a business, a home, a pension, a security, or any other asset whose value ultimately depends on stable law, public credit, functioning markets, and broad political legitimacy. The Plan’s central proposition is that preserving and renewing the middle class is not class warfare.

It is an investment in the economic and political system that made extraordinary private success possible in the first place.

The case the Payback Plan is designed to address

The American middle class is not merely an income category. It is an economic engine, a source of demand, a reservoir of skill and entrepreneurship, a stabilizing political institution, and a broad constituency for the rule of law. Families that can save, buy homes, educate children, withstand setbacks, start businesses, and plan confidently for retirement have a durable stake in the country’s future. Families living one disruption away from lasting financial distress do not have the same margin for error. Payback therefore treats a secure and forward-looking middle class as part of the economic and institutional foundation of the country, not as a secondary social concern.

Payback is not a plan to freeze the economy in an earlier era. Technology, globalization, artificial intelligence, demographics, and changing patterns of ownership will continue to transform work. Productive change should continue. The task is to make adaptation compatible with useful work, education, economic security, and upward movement for ordinary citizens. The goal is adaptation, not nostalgia.

At the same time, the federal government continues to spend more than it collects in revenue and finances the difference by issuing debt. A structural deficit is not simply a temporary shortfall caused by a recession or emergency. It is a deficit that persists under ordinary conditions because ongoing commitments exceed ongoing revenue. In February 2026, the Congressional Budget Office projected a federal deficit of about $1.9 trillion for fiscal year 2026, equal to 5.8 percent of GDP, and projected debt held by the public to rise from about 101 percent of GDP in 2026 to 120 percent in 2036 under then-current law.

CBO also projected net interest outlays to rise from about $1.0 trillion in 2026 to about $2.1 trillion in 2036. These are projections, not certainties, but they show the scale and direction of the fiscal problem if policy does not change. [1] The financing timetable for the major social-insurance programs is also drawing closer. The 2026 Social Security and Medicare Trustees projected that the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance trust fund would be able to pay full scheduled benefits until the fourth quarter of 2032, after which continuing income would cover about 78 percent of scheduled benefits absent legislative change.

The Medicare Hospital Insurance trust fund was projected to remain able to pay full scheduled benefits until the second quarter of 2033, with about 89 percent of scheduled benefits payable at depletion. [2] These facts do not dictate one tax system or one spending program. They do establish the fiscal constraint within which every serious proposal must operate: America cannot indefinitely preserve and improve the social insurance needed for a changing economy while financing an increasing share of government through debt. Borrowing is indispensable during wars, recessions, emergencies, and for investments whose benefits extend into the future. Persistent structural borrowing is different.

As debt and interest compound, government gives up room to respond to the next crisis, places a growing claim on future taxpayers, and exposes more of the budget to financial-market conditions it cannot control. Payback treats that erosion of fiscal capacity as a form of generational inequity: the present should not consume resources that future Americans may urgently need.

The Payback compact: reciprocity and stewardship

The Payback Plan begins with reciprocity. Rights endure only when institutions capable of protecting them endure as well. Citizens have rights, but durable institutions also require contributions. Businesses are entitled to profit, innovation, and private ownership, but they should compete rather than capture the rules. Workers should be expected to contribute, learn, and adapt where able, but society should not confuse the market price of an ordinary skill with the human worth of the person who possesses it.

Government may tax and spend for lawful public purposes, but it owes citizens competence, transparency, due process, fiscal discipline, and respect for property and taxpayer rights. Private wealth does not create, grow, or protect itself in an institutional vacuum. America supplies the legal and public framework that makes large-scale private enterprise possible: courts that enforce contracts and property rights; corporate, securities, and bankruptcy law; stable public credit and currency; schools and universities that educate workers and citizens; transportation, communications, energy, and other infrastructure; national defense and public safety; open capital markets; and public institutions capable of resolving disputes under law.

These institutions do not weaken private ownership. They are what make private ownership secure, transferable, financeable, and valuable. They require sustained public support. Congress can enact a tax or an appropriation by majority vote, but a constitutional democracy cannot sustain large, long-lived commitments through permanent political warfare. Durable policy requires more than legal authority; it requires enough legitimacy to last.

That legitimacy depends on a broad public conviction that the system remains lawful, open, and capable of giving ordinary citizens a fair opportunity to advance. It does not require agreement on every tax or program. It does require confidence that the rules are not simply instruments of whoever has the greatest economic or political power. That is where the middle class becomes indispensable.

Political stability does not mean insulating wealth from democratic debate or promising equal outcomes. It means preserving enough confidence that Americans continue to settle disagreements through elections, courts, markets, and general laws rather than through confiscation, favoritism, or personal rule. A broad, prosperous, forward-looking middle class has a concrete stake in that order. A shrinking and insecure middle class that no longer believes effort can lead to security has less reason to defend it.

The top 1 percent therefore occupies a special place in the Payback compact, not because exceptional success is wrongful, but because the largest fortunes have the largest absolute stake in the institutions that protect private wealth and the greatest capacity to help sustain them. Payback asks the most successful Americans to lead an investment in middle-class renewal as an exercise in enlightened self-interest and stewardship. The argument is not guilt. It is that preserving the system that protects extraordinary success is itself a rational investment.

A social contract for an economy in transition

The arrangements that helped build the postwar middle class arose in a different economy – one in which long careers with a single employer were more common, advanced technology displaced workers more slowly, employer-provided benefits were more stable, and the fiscal demands of an aging population were less immediate. That world will not return. The relevant question is not how to preserve yesterday’s jobs, but how to preserve the ability of ordinary Americans to remain secure, productive, and hopeful while the economy changes. For Payback, the objective is reasonable security and opportunity, not equal outcomes.

All working adults, independent of income, should be entitled under law to a defined foundation of social insurance: a decent retirement; adequate healthcare for themselves and their families; continuing access to education and retraining throughout working life; a realistic path to post-secondary education for their children; and meaningful assistance when technological or economic change destroys a job faster than a worker can reasonably replace it. The legal entitlement is to basic protection against risks that individuals cannot efficiently bear alone, not to identical economic outcomes or identical public subsidies for every household. Rights under that compact carry reciprocal obligations.

Adults who are able to work should be expected to work, learn, adapt, and contribute. Private employment should remain the preferred source of ordinary work, and policy should not slow technological progress merely to preserve obsolete jobs. But when the private market cannot provide viable work for displaced people who are willing and able to contribute, Payback favors transitional public or nonprofit employment in useful, labor-intensive services – “people helping people” jobs that improve life for underserved Americans. Taxpayers should receive a meaningful return when government spends their money.

Payback therefore prefers useful work to unconditional income for able-bodied workers or indefinite subsidies for private jobs that no longer make economic sense. The principle is both social and institutional. A society that asks millions of ordinary citizens to absorb the losses from technological change while a comparatively small number capture a disproportionate share of the gains risks weakening the confidence on which competitive capitalism and constitutional government depend. If hard work ceases to offer a credible path to security, movements promising confiscation, protection, favoritism, or personal rule become easier to sell.

That instability can damage investment, weaken respect for property and contracts, and threaten the institutional framework on which private wealth itself depends. Middle-class renewal is therefore not only social policy; in Payback’s framework it is risk management for the constitutional economy. A new social contract will cost money. The Plan rejects the politically comfortable fiction that the country can promise broad security, preserve national credit, avoid difficult spending choices, and still refuse to collect the revenue necessary to finance what it has chosen.

Social insurance should be designed carefully and administered efficiently. But once lawful commitments are made, fiscal honesty requires that the nation pay for them over time rather than routinely transferring the bill to future generations. In Payback’s framework, fiscal discipline is not the enemy of the social contract. It is one of its obligations.

Keep the two tasks distinct

The Payback Plan separates two questions that American policy too often mixes together: how government should raise revenue, and how government should use public resources. The first is principally a tax question. The second is principally a social-insurance and public-program question. They interact, but hiding one inside the other obscures both accountability and tradeoffs.

The tax system should raise the revenue government requires as fairly, simply, transparently, and growth-consciously as practicable. Social insurance should then address defined risks and opportunities directly: retirement insecurity, healthcare costs, disability, education and retraining, worker displacement, and other needs that citizens acting alone cannot efficiently insure against. The cleaner the separation, the easier it is for the public to see what is being taxed, why it is being taxed, and what the resulting revenue is meant to accomplish.

Why Payback begins with tax reform

If the country needs more durable revenue, it should first ask whether that revenue can be raised from a broader measure of income with fewer unnecessary distortions. Current federal law does not use one common tax base. The individual income tax uses one definition of taxable income after exclusions, deductions, credits, deferrals, and preferential rates. Payroll taxes apply mainly to wages and self-employment earnings under different rules.

The corporate income tax applies to C corporations at the entity level. Estate and gift taxes use still another set of rules for large transfers. Each system has its own base, rates, timing rules, exceptions, and collection machinery. Some differences are necessary.

Real differences among wages, investments, business ownership, and inheritances can require different rules for basis, timing, liquidity, valuation, and collection. But other differences reflect history, political bargaining, or opportunities for tax planning. The consequence is straightforward: economically comparable income can bear different federal tax burdens because it arrives through a different source or legal form. That weakens horizontal equity – the principle that comparable income should generally bear comparable tax – and can reward tax planning rather than productive activity.

The Ameri-Share Tax, or AST, is Payback’s proposed answer to that fragmentation. It would replace several major federal tax systems with one general tax on personal income, while preserving different rules where real economic, legal, or administrative differences require them. Employers, businesses, financial institutions, and fiduciaries could still withhold or report tax where those collection methods work well. The objective is not simplicity for its own sake. It is a more coherent way to raise the revenue Congress decides it needs.

What the Ameri-Share Tax is – and is not

The AST is a broad, source-neutral, progressive tax on individual income. Here, “income” means new economic resources that increase what a person can consume, save, or invest. The term is broader than the taxable income shown on a current federal return. It excludes the recovery of the taxpayer’s own invested capital, genuine borrowing, and other amounts that are not new income.

The AST is designed to raise the revenue Congress requires through a structure that Payback argues is fair, transparent, administrable, and compatible with long-term sustainable growth. It is not a wealth tax. It is not designed to equalize wealth. Under Payback, the tax system has a narrower job: raise revenue under general rules. Social insurance and public programs determine how that revenue is used.

Social insurance and public programs determine how the revenue is used. [3][4] Income is not the same as wealth. A home, business, or security can rise in value without creating current AST income. Return of the taxpayer’s own capital is not income. A bona fide loan is debt, not income.

Basis, losses, timing, liquidity, valuation, and legal enforceability still matter because they determine whether new income exists, how much exists, and when it should be taxed. Source-neutrality means that comparable income should not bear a different ultimate tax merely because it came from a different source. Salary, interest, dividends, investment gains, business distributions, and large gifts or inheritances can require different rules for measurement or timing. But the source label alone should not decide the tax burden.

The AST therefore starts with a demanding presumption: the same income should bear the same tax unless a real difference justifies another rule. [3][4] That is why the AST would replace several major federal tax bases rather than simply add another layer. Current Law taxes personal income, payroll, corporate income, and large transfers under separate systems. The AST would use one broad personal-income base and one general rate structure, with special rules only where they are needed. For a fixed revenue target, a broader base can also reduce the rates a narrower base would require.

Payback’s claim is not that tax design can guarantee growth. It is that a source-neutral structure can leave more investment and consumption choices to taxpayers and markets instead of using tax differences to steer them.

Tax preferences, rent-seeking, and ‘oligarchic socialism’

A tax preference gives a particular activity, source of income, industry, asset, or transaction more favorable treatment than the general rule. It may take the form of an exclusion, deduction, credit, preferred rate, special deferral, or special entity rule. Some preferences have legitimate purposes. Others steer money toward a tax-favored choice rather than the choice that would create greater value before tax. That distinction matters because a preference is not free simply because its cost is hidden inside the tax code.

Preferences also narrow the tax base and can require higher rates elsewhere if government is to raise the same revenue. [8] The problem becomes more serious when taxpayers seek gains through favorable government rules rather than through better products, lower costs, innovation, or productive investment. Economists call this rent-seeking. In ordinary language, it is the use of political influence to obtain an advantage that the market itself would not provide. The costs can include lost revenue, wasted lobbying and tax-planning effort, distorted investment, and a less level field for competitors.

Payback uses the phrase ‘oligarchic socialism’ for the extreme form of that problem: private ownership remains, but powerful private interests use government to protect rents, shift losses, restrict competition, or obtain special economic treatment. The phrase does not imply that every preference is corrupt or inefficient. It names a specific danger – public power used to allocate private advantage instead of protecting open competition. The AST therefore begins with a strong presumption against tax preferences, not an absolute ban.

A different rule may be justified by measurement, constitutional limits, liquidity, transition, administrability, or a public purpose that cannot be achieved better outside the tax code. But the exception carries the burden of justification. It should survive because it improves the system as a whole, not because it has acquired a constituency. That is the function of the Better-Way rule, an integral part of the AST.

The Better-Way rule and the National Tax Council

The Better-Way rule is the AST’s built-in discipline against dogma. No nonconstitutional rate, threshold, timing rule, collection method, preference, or other AST mechanism is protected simply because Payback once adopted it. If credible evidence shows that a feasible alternative can raise the required revenue with a materially better combination of long-term sustainable growth, social equity, legality, administrability, taxpayer rights, compliance, and fiscal reliability, the AST should change. [3][4] The proposed National Tax Council, or NTC, would make that review continuous and public.

The NTC would maintain models, publish data and assumptions, identify uncertainty, report material disagreement, study the tax base and rates, and recommend changes when the evidence warrants them. Its job would not be to defend the AST. Its job would be to test it. That distinction is central to Payback’s claim to credibility. Congress would set the fiscal target – the amount of revenue the tax system must raise.

The NTC would then study rate schedules capable of meeting that target while respecting the poverty floor, the rule that another dollar of income must leave the taxpayer with additional after-tax income at or above the poverty threshold, and basic legal and administrative limits. Among workable schedules, it would examine the balance between long-term sustainable growth and social equity, including effects on work, saving, investment, consumption, entrepreneurship, debt, concentration, and the distribution of tax burdens. Congress would remain responsible for tax law. The NTC could recommend a rate, a base change, or the abandonment of an AST rule; it could not enact any of them.

The Better-Way rule is not a license for constant tinkering. Stability has economic value. The NTC should recommend change only when the expected improvement justifies the cost and disruption of changing the law. Self-correction and stability are both part of the design.

Building the Ameri-Share tax base

The AST base can be understood in three components, governed throughout by one investment rule. The AST does not tax the return of the taxpayer’s own capital. It treats investment return as income, but postpones tax for as long as that return remains continuously invested in a qualifying productive investment. If the previously untaxed return later becomes available for personal consumption or another nonqualifying use, it becomes taxable then. The rule changes the timing of tax; it does not erase the tax. [3][4]

Component 1 – Start with Expanded Personal Income, or EPI. EPI is based on the broad income measure the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation uses when it compares how tax proposals affect households. It includes items such as wages, compensation, interest, dividends, rents, royalties, retirement income, business and investment income, realized gains, and certain employer-provided benefits. For AST purposes, EPI is adjusted by the investment rule just described: qualifying investment return is not taxed while it remains continuously invested, and previously postponed return is included when it leaves qualifying investment. [4][7]

Component 2 – Add Owner-Attributable Business Income, or OABI. OABI is additional business-owner income that has not already been counted in Component 1. It includes untaxed business income that becomes available to an owner for personal or other nonqualifying use, after excluding return of the owner’s investment, bona fide debt, reimbursements, amounts already taxed, and amounts that remain continuously invested in qualifying productive investments. For example, assume an owner invests $100,000 in a business and later receives a $140,000 distribution, with no prior recovery of the investment. The first $100,000 returns the owner’s capital and is not income. The remaining $40,000 is income. It is taxed if used for personal or other nonqualifying purposes. Tax is postponed to the extent the $40,000 remains continuously invested in a qualifying productive investment. [3][4]

Component 3 – Add Beneficiary-Attributable Income, or BAI. BAI is the taxable part of gifts, inheritances, and similar transfers after the beneficiary’s remaining lifetime allowance is applied. The present Payback policy sets that cumulative allowance at an indexed $5 million, subject to change by Congress. If a beneficiary has already used $4.5 million of the allowance and then receives another $1 million covered transfer, $500,000 is above the remaining allowance and enters the AST base, subject to the other applicable rules. [3][4]

In simplified form, the annual AST base is adjusted EPI, plus OABI not already counted in EPI, plus taxable BAI. Basis, debt, losses, prior inclusions, and other reconciliation rules prevent the same economic value from being taxed twice. [3][4]

Businesses: protect the enterprise, tax the owner

The AST’s business principle is deliberately simple: protect the enterprise; tax the owner. A business needs working capital, inventory, research, equipment, reserves, expansion funds, debt service, employee compensation, and other resources to operate and grow. The AST does not impose tax merely because value remains inside a business. Capital that remains in bona fide productive use can continue to work, compound, hire, and finance growth. [4] Current Law, by contrast, taxes business income differently depending on legal form.

A C corporation generally pays corporate income tax on its taxable income, and shareholders can later owe tax on dividends or taxable gains. Partnerships and S corporations generally pass-through taxable items to their owners, who can owe tax even when the business keeps the cash. Under the AST, the corporation would not bear a separate final corporate income tax, and pass-through owners would not be taxed each year merely because the business earned and retained profit. Instead, untaxed business income would be taxed when it becomes the owner’s personal or other nonqualifying income, after return of capital and other non-income items are excluded.

The investment rule described above governs any amount that remains productively invested. A business could still withhold or prepay tax when that is the most reliable collection method, with the payment credited to the owner’s liability. The rule must also reach personal benefits that do not arrive as an ordinary cash distribution. Otherwise an owner could avoid tax simply by changing the form of the withdrawal.

A business payment of an owner’s personal expense, personal use of business property, satisfaction of an owner’s personal debt, a noncommercial transfer to a related party, or a sham loan can create taxable owner income. A genuine business reimbursement is not personal income, and a bona fide commercial loan remains debt. The governing distinction is economic reality: tax the owner’s real personal benefit without taxing legitimate business activity.

Gifts, inheritances, and other large transfers

The AST combines covered gifts, inheritances, and similar transfers into one lifetime account for each beneficiary. The present Payback policy gives each beneficiary a $5 million indexed lifetime allowance, subject to change by Congress. Once the beneficiary has used that allowance, additional covered transfers become BAI and enter the beneficiary’s AST base. A trust, family partnership, holding company, or other legal arrangement does not create another allowance merely because the same benefit reaches the beneficiary through a different path. [3][4] This differs from the present federal estate-and-gift-tax system.

The estate tax starts with the decedent’s taxable estate. The gift tax generally starts with the donor and coordinates lifetime gifts with the estate tax. The AST starts with the beneficiary because it asks how much new income the beneficiary received. Assume, for example, that a $20 million estate passes in equal shares to four children who have received no prior covered transfers.

The estate tax asks what the estate owes. The AST asks what each child received and how much of that child’s lifetime allowance remains. The result can differ if the same estate is divided among several beneficiaries rather than left to one. The beneficiary approach also follows source-neutrality.

An inheritance is not the same human event as a salary. But after the lifetime allowance has been used, both can provide new resources that the beneficiary can consume, save, or invest. The AST therefore places the taxable excess under the same general rate structure as other income rather than giving it a permanent preference solely because it came by gift or inheritance. Hard-to-sell property requires special treatment.

An inherited family business, farm, or other illiquid asset may create taxable value without providing cash to pay the tax immediately. The AST addresses that problem through payment timing, installments, secured deferral, or similar rules rather than through an automatic forced sale or permanent exclusion. Basis rules must also coordinate the transfer with any later sale so the same value is not taxed twice.

Poverty protection

The AST starts with a firm floor: no positive AST liability should arise on income below 125 percent of the applicable poverty threshold. Congress may provide greater protection, but not less under the present Payback principle. This floor is not a definition of the middle class and does not determine eligibility for Social Security, Medicare, or other programs. Its purpose is narrower and explicit: the federal tax system should not tax income that the Plan treats as necessary for basic subsistence. [3][4] Replacing broad Social Security and Medicare payroll taxes would reinforce that protection.

Under Current Law, payroll taxes impose a separate charge on wages and self-employment income, including the earnings of many workers who owe little or no individual income tax. Under the AST, Social Security and Medicare would instead be financed from the broader AST base. A low-wage worker protected by the poverty floor would not face a separate payroll tax on the same wages. In statutory design, that shifts more of the financing burden away from low wages and toward the broader income base.

The employer side matters as well. Payroll taxes add to the cost of employing workers. At the margin, that tax can affect the choice between hiring labor and using labor-saving technology. The AST would remove that tax-created difference.

That would not stop automation, and Payback does not propose that it should. Demand, productivity, wages, technology, and capital costs matter far more in many decisions. The principle is narrower: tax policy should not needlessly favor automation or labor when the market can make the choice. [9]

Progressive rates with no tax cliffs

Above the poverty floor, the AST uses progressive rates: taxpayers with more taxable income pay a larger share of that income. No revenue target, rate, or threshold is permanent. Congress sets the fiscal requirement. The NTC analyzes the economic conditions, tests rate schedules that can meet that requirement, and recommends changes when the evidence warrants them.

Congress decides. [3][4] The current AST design tests whole-income rates. Under Current Law’s marginal brackets, a higher rate applies only to the dollars inside the higher bracket. Under a whole-income approach, the applicable rate is intended to describe the share of the taxpayer’s entire taxable income paid in tax. That creates a danger if one rate suddenly replaces another.

A small increase in income could otherwise cause a large jump in tax. The AST therefore requires the transition between rates to be smoothed so that every additional dollar of income leaves the taxpayer with additional after-tax income. No fixed one-point rate increments or smoothing formula are permanent Payback rules; they remain subject to the Better-Way test. [3][4] A simple example shows the point. Suppose a schedule calls for a 10 percent whole-income rate at $100,000 of taxable income and a 15 percent rate at $125,000. The rate would not jump from 10 percent to 15 percent at $100,001. It would rise gradually across the transition range. The IRS would publish tax tables or equivalent schedules showing the resulting liability, so a taxpayer could see the overall share of taxable income paid in federal tax without facing a cliff in which one extra dollar of income produces a net loss. The Plan would make the distribution of the burden public as well.

The NTC would publish an annual table showing, for each income group, its average effective tax rate, total tax, share of total AST liability, and average after-tax income. That disclosure is not cosmetic. It would let taxpayers see both their own overall rate and their group’s share of the national tax burden. Transparency cannot settle every disagreement about fairness, but it can force the disagreement onto common facts. [3][4][5]

Administration, enforcement, and taxpayer rights

No broad tax deserves confidence unless it can be administered fairly. The AST therefore treats taxpayer rights as part of the tax system itself, not as an afterthought. Notice, privacy, confidentiality, representation, independent review, correction, appeal, cybersecurity, and data minimization are basic protections. The system does not require continuous government monitoring of every household asset.

It requires reliable records of taxable events and enough information to collect the lawfully due tax without taxing the same income twice. The tax gap shows why administration matters. The tax gap is the difference between taxes legally owed and taxes paid voluntarily and on time. The IRS projects a Tax Year 2022 gross tax gap of about $696 billion on estimated true tax liability of about $4.635 trillion, a voluntary compliance rate of 85.0 percent.

It projects about $90 billion of later collections through enforcement and other late payments, leaving a net tax gap of about $606 billion. Underreporting is the largest component, about $539 billion, or roughly 77 percent of the gross gap. [6] The tax gap is not a measure of fraud. It also includes mistakes, negligence, non-filing, underpayment, reporting failures, legal uncertainty, and inability to pay. Fraud is the intentional part of noncompliance and must be proved as such.

Fraud’s total national amount is not separately measured in the IRS tax-gap estimate. IRS Criminal Investigation reported identifying about $4.5 billion in tax fraud in fiscal year 2025, but that figure covers detected criminal cases, not the total amount of tax fraud. Criminal cases show recurring methods such as false returns, sham entities or trusts, disguised transactions, hidden income, abusive shelters, and refund schemes. [11] The lesson for Payback is practical: a tax system that depends on a broad base must make compliance and verification central design questions. Compliance is easiest when a third party reports the same transaction and tax is collected close to the payment.

Wages illustrate the point. Owner distributions, trusts, related-party transactions, cross-border arrangements, basis claims, and disguised personal benefits can be harder to verify. The AST would therefore require strong information reporting and durable records in those areas, together with modern data matching and specialized expertise. The objective is rigorous but targeted enforcement, not indiscriminate scrutiny.

The IRS should concentrate scarce examination and criminal-investigation resources where the expected unpaid tax, complexity, concealment risk, and collection value are greatest. That includes high-dollar owner-business, trust, valuation, offshore, sham-loan, and related-party cases when objective facts justify scrutiny. Fraud should be investigated and referred for criminal enforcement when evidence shows willful evasion. Mistakes and genuine legal disputes should be handled through correction, civil examination, and appeal.

Wealth or income alone is not evidence of wrongdoing. The governing rule is the least intrusive reliable method consistent with collecting the tax Congress enacted. [3][4] Effective enforcement also requires adequate staff, technology, taxpayer service, and clear law. More auditors alone cannot cure an ambiguous statute. Treasury and the IRS would administer the law Congress enacts, issue rules needed to apply it, and report recurring statutory gaps to Congress.

Nor could administrators create new taxable events through regulation, software, or enforcement practice. Congress would retain authority over rates, bases, allowances, and other material tax rules. The NTC would identify problems and recommend legislative corrections. The line between administration and lawmaking should remain visible.

How the AST differs from Current Law

The serious case for the AST is not that it would make every tax question simple. No national tax system can do that. The claim is that the overall architecture would be substantially simpler than Current Law. Current Law uses separate individual income, payroll, corporate income, and estate-and-gift tax systems, each with its own base, rates, timing rules, preferences, and filing requirements. The AST would replace those principal systems with one broad personal-income tax and one general rate structure, while retaining specific rules for basis, losses, investment timing, business-owner income, large transfers, and collection where those rules are genuinely necessary. [10]

Individual income tax. Current Law begins with gross income and then applies exclusions, deductions, credits, preferred rates, deferrals, and many special rules. The AST would begin with broader EPI, apply the same general rate structure to comparable income, and require special treatment to justify itself. It would not eliminate the need to measure basis, losses, or timing. It would eliminate many source-based preferences and distinctions that exist only because different forms of income receive different tax treatment. [7][8][10]

Payroll taxes. Current Law finances much of Social Security and Medicare through separate taxes on wages and self-employment income. The AST would finance those programs from the broader AST base. That would remove a separate tax on labor and spread the financing burden across wages, investment income, taxable owner income, and taxable large transfers. It would not change Social Security or Medicare benefits by itself. [9][10]

Corporate income tax. Current Law imposes a separate federal tax on C-corporation income and then can tax shareholders when profits are distributed or gains are realized. It also requires extensive corporate tax accounting. The AST would end the corporate income tax as a separate final tax and would tax untaxed business income at the owner level under the rules described above. Businesses would still need ordinary financial and tax records. But the AST would remove a separate layer of substantive federal income taxation and many rules whose purpose is to calculate that separate corporate tax. [4][10]

Estate and gift taxes. Current Law generally taxes large transfers from the donor or decedent side and has its own exclusions, deductions, valuation rules, and planning structures. The AST would tax covered transfers at the beneficiary level after one cumulative lifetime allowance. The reason is simple: after the allowance, the transfer gives the beneficiary new income that can be consumed, saved, or invested.

The AST is not designed to equalize wealth; it is designed to apply one general income-tax principle to comparable personal income. [3][4][10] Its claim is therefore architectural, not utopian. The AST would still require rules for capital recovery, losses, business-owner benefits, qualifying investment, large transfers, valuation, fraud, and collection. No serious national tax system can avoid those questions. Payback’s narrower proposition is that one coherent system can replace four major tax structures and many source-based preferences without pretending that hard tax questions disappear.

The Better-Way rule is the safeguard against treating that proposition as an article of faith. If the simpler architecture fails to raise revenue reliably, protect taxpayer rights, or perform better in practice, it must be changed. Adaptability is another intended advantage. Current Law spreads federal revenue across several tax systems, each with its own base, rates, and economic effects.

A major change in the fiscal requirement therefore forces Congress to decide not only how much revenue to raise, but which tax base to change and how the change will interact with the others. The AST would begin with one broad base and one general rate structure. As conditions change, Congress could often respond mainly through rate changes after NTC review, with those rates reflecting the conditions of the time. Rates would still have to balance revenue needs, long-term growth, and social equity.

Rate changes cannot cure a defective tax base or weak administration. If evidence exposes such a defect, the Better-Way rule requires structural repair. But a broad common base gives Congress a simpler starting point for adapting to changing fiscal conditions. [3][4][10]

Why delay makes the fiscal choices harder

Federal debt held by the public was about 25 percent of GDP in 1980. It was about 99 percent in the first quarter of 2026, and CBO projects about 101 percent for fiscal year 2026. From fiscal year 1980 through fiscal year 2025, annual federal deficits averaged about 3.9 percent of GDP. Those figures reflect many causes, including recessions, wars and emergencies, demographic change, rising health and interest costs, as well as spending and tax decisions.

Payback does not need to assign the rise in debt to a single cause. The cumulative result is enough to frame the problem: the federal government now carries far more debt relative to the economy than it did a generation ago. Over much of the same period, CBO also finds that income grew across the distribution but grew fastest for households near the top. [1][12][14] The current economic environment, including a year-over-year August 2026 consumer price rise of 3.4 percent, has increased financial pressure on many households, particularly those with limited savings.

On September 16, the Federal Reserve raised the federal funds target range to 3.75 to 4.00 percent, and inflation remained elevated. The 10-year Treasury yield was about 5.0 percent at the same time. Long-term interest rates reflect many forces – inflation expectations, economic growth, Federal Reserve policy, global demand for bonds, and the supply of debt among them. Persistent federal borrowing is one source of upward pressure on interest rates, but it is not the only one. [1][13]

Higher interest rates do not affect everyone the same way. Savers can benefit, while households and businesses that must borrow face higher costs. Mortgages, auto loans, business credit, and other financing become more expensive as market rates rise. For households with little savings and a need to borrow, those costs can reduce disposable income and financial security. Persistent deficits also increase the government’s own debt-service costs. A structural deficit therefore cannot be reduced without choices: Congress can raise revenue, restrain spending, redesign social-insurance benefits, or combine those approaches. Every path imposes costs on people who have reason to resist them. That is precisely why delay is politically tempting. [1][13]

Payback’s stated priority is to protect and renew the middle class while restoring fiscal discipline. It does not claim that the AST alone can solve the deficit. Its narrower claim is that, if Congress decides additional revenue is required, a broader and more adaptable tax system can raise that revenue with fewer tax-created distortions and with a clearer public accounting of who bears the burden. The Calculator described below is designed to let readers test that claim under Current Law and the AST at the same revenue target.

Tax reform in an economy unfriendly to the middle class

Consider the policy choice Payback is designed to examine. Congress concludes that the annual deficit must be cut substantially and decides not to accomplish that by reducing Social Security, Medicare, or other basic social-insurance protections. Payback does not predict that Congress will make this choice. It asks what follows economically if Congress does.

The starting point is how differently income has grown across the distribution. Between 1979 and 2023, real average wages for the bottom 90 percent rose about 44 percent. For the top 1 percent, they rose about 182 percent. The top 1 percent’s share of all wages increased from 7.3 percent to 12.4 percent, while the share going to the bottom 90 percent fell from 69.8 percent to 60.7 percent. [15] That gap helps explain why many middle-class families have experienced far smaller gains in wage income than households at the top.

Those long-run differences coexist with substantial household financial pressure. In the Federal Reserve’s 2025 household survey, 58 percent of adults said recent price changes had made their financial situation worse, 16 percent had not paid all of their bills in full in the preceding month, and 26 percent had skipped some medical care because of cost. [16] Whatever label the public debate gives the problem, the pressure on many household budgets is measurable.

Social-insurance benefits matter because they are not abstract budget entries. They are retirement income, healthcare financing, and protection against risks that many households cannot efficiently bear alone. CBO’s current baseline illustrates the tradeoff. In its payable-benefits Social Security scenario, an abrupt reduction in benefits would directly reduce retirement income for affected beneficiaries and initially reduce consumer spending and GDP. Over time, however, greater work, greater saving, and lower federal borrowing would raise private investment and output. [1] For households living close to current income, those later gains may come too late to offset an immediate loss. Bills and creditors do not wait.

The Payback scenario is therefore a stated distributional policy assumption, not an economic prediction: Congress protects basic social insurance and reduces the deficit through higher taxes. Once that premise is adopted, the analytical question becomes more precise. It is no longer whether spending cuts and taxes should be combined. It is where a large revenue increase can be absorbed with the least damage to households, consumption, saving, investment, and growth across the economic distribution.

If need be, who can absorb higher taxes – and why

Under this scenario, Congress has chosen to cut the deficit through higher taxes rather than cuts in basic social insurance. CBO projects a fiscal year 2026 deficit of about $1.9 trillion, so cutting it in half entirely through added revenue would require roughly $950 billion a year. [1] No tax increase of that size would be painless. The relevant economic question is not answered by calling the choice ‘class warfare.’ It is where the needed revenue can be raised with the least damage to family budgets, investment, and growth.

Capacity to absorb higher taxes depends in part on current income and accumulated wealth, viewed together with how each has changed over time. Higher and more consistent gains generally leave more room to absorb a tax increase; lower or less consistent gains leave less room. Comparing the income and wealth of the top 1 percent with those of the broad middle and lower parts of the distribution is therefore directly relevant to who can bear a larger share of a major tax increase.

The wage data show the scale of the difference. In 2023, average real wages were about $43,000 for the bottom 90 percent and about $794,000 for the top 1 percent – more than 18 times as much at the top. From 1979 through 2023, those wages rose about 44 percent for the bottom 90 percent and about 182 percent for the top 1 percent. [15] Wealth was more concentrated still. In 2026:Q2, the top 1 percent held about $60.3 trillion, or 32.5 percent of household net worth, while the bottom 50 percent held about $4.3 trillion, or 2.3 percent. [17]

Those differences have practical consequences. A family living mainly on wages with little savings often meets a tax increase by cutting spending or saving less. A high-income household with substantial wealth generally has more room to absorb a tax increase without materially reducing its standard of living. Federal Reserve research finds that higher-income households tend to spend less of an additional dollar of wealth than households with fewer resources. [18] Put simply, a tax dollar collected from a household living close to its paycheck is more likely to reduce current spending. Lower consumer spending, all else equal, weakens near-term demand and can slow growth.

History also belongs in the analysis. In 1981 the top individual income-tax rate was cut from 70 percent to 50 percent, and later laws reduced taxes on high incomes and capital. CBO found that the 2017 tax law reduced taxes for the top 1 percent, with much of the reduction driven by lower corporate taxes. [19][20] Those tax cuts did not by themselves create today’s debt. But when tax reductions are not matched by spending cuts or other revenue, they increase deficits and debt. They also increase after-tax income for affected households and, to the extent those gains are saved or invested, can add to private wealth. Payback regards this connection as significant while recognizing that its size over nearly four decades cannot be isolated from the many other forces affecting both wealth and debt.

A constant-dollar comparison shows the scale of the two changes without pretending to prove causation. Using the GDP price deflator to express both series in 2026:Q1 dollars, the wealth of the top 1 percent rose from about $10.7 trillion in 1989:Q3 to $54.8 trillion in 2026:Q1, a gain of $44.1 trillion. Federal debt held by the public rose from about $5.0 trillion to $31.5 trillion, a gain of $26.4 trillion. The increase in top-1-percent wealth was therefore about $17.7 trillion larger. [17][21]

Over the same period, the top 1 percent’s share of household net worth rose from 22.8 percent to 31.7 percent, while federal debt held by the public rose from 38.3 percent to 98.7 percent of GDP. [12][17] These figures do not measure how much of one increase caused the other; they show the scale of the two changes. The tax-policy connection described above remains part of Payback’s explanation, but the size of that connection cannot be isolated precisely. Payback opposes a wealth tax on policy grounds. At the same time, given the concentration of income and wealth, it is not difficult to understand why wealth-tax proposals have attracted substantial public support. [22]

Payback regards the combined evidence as supporting a clear distributional conclusion within this scenario: the top 1 percent have substantially greater capacity to absorb a major tax increase than the bottom 90 percent. That does not make taxes on the top 1 percent costless, and it does not eliminate effects on saving, investment, behavior, or growth. It means that, if Congress chooses to raise substantial additional revenue, differences in income, wealth, and financial cushions belong at the center of the analysis rather than at its margins.

The Ameri-Share Tax Calculator: make the tradeoffs visible

The public AST Calculator 3.0 turns the Plan’s tax argument into a testable comparison. It lets readers examine how a chosen federal revenue target would be distributed across income groups under Current Law and the AST. The Calculator and its User Guide are available without charge at paybackplan.org. The site also provides an AI reference package containing the governing Payback materials so readers can trace assumptions, definitions, sources, and calculations in a compatible AI system.

The AI package does not validate the Calculator, and AI answers can be wrong; the cited source materials remain the authority. [3][5] The Calculator uses a FY/TY2023 benchmark and seven analytical income groups to make the comparison manageable. Those groups are modeling categories, not statutory tax brackets, and the analytical $10 million-plus category is not a permanent AST threshold. [5] Its central discipline is equal-revenue comparison. Current Law and AST scenarios carry the same modeled revenue target, so one system cannot appear less burdensome merely because it raises less money.

The model uses EPI as a common measuring yardstick for the income groups while keeping that yardstick separate from each system’s legal tax base. [5] The Calculator is a policy-comparison and scenario tool, not an official score by Treasury, the Joint Committee on Taxation, CBO, or the IRS. Some inputs come directly from official data; others are derived estimates, provisional allocations, sensitivity assumptions, or policy rules. TARGET MET means only that modeled statutory liability reaches the selected target under the stated assumptions. It does not certify collected revenue, economic growth, taxpayer behavior, final economic incidence, migration, or nationwide administrative performance. [5] Those limits are not defects to be hidden. They are part of an honest public model.

A credible public model must distinguish what the data show from what the model assumes. Payback applies the same standard to itself. Claims about the AST remain open to testing, correction, and the Better-Way rule. A proposal that asks to be taken seriously should also state what could prove it wrong.

What success would look like

The Payback Plan is ultimately not about a tax form. It is about preserving a society in which competitive capitalism, private property, technological progress, individual success, social stability, and constitutional government reinforce one another rather than pull apart. It describes an America that pays honestly for what it chooses to do, protects its credit, keeps productive investment attractive, gives ordinary citizens a realistic chance to remain economically secure and upwardly mobile, and asks those with the greatest ability to pay to contribute more toward maintaining the system that protects their success. None of that eliminates hard choices.

It makes the hard choices visible. Some spending will have to be restrained or redesigned. Some taxes will have to rise or broaden. Social insurance will have to become more sustainable and more responsive to a labor market transformed by technology. Pretending otherwise does not avoid the tradeoffs; it only postpones them.

Existing tax preferences will have to justify themselves. Government will have to prove that additional revenue is administered responsibly. Citizens at every income level will have obligations as well as claims. Payback’s point is not that reform is painless. It is that the status quo is not painless either, and its costs increasingly arrive through debt service, program shortfalls, insecurity, and narrowed choices.

Debt service, program shortfalls, technological displacement, and political distrust can narrow the country’s choices if reform is delayed. Payback’s position is that America should confront these pressures while it still has room to choose among alternatives. The Plan is offered in that spirit. It is non-commercial and non-partisan.

It does not ask readers for uncritical agreement. It asks for something more demanding: examine the proposal, test its assumptions, challenge its weaknesses, improve it where possible, and reject it where a better solution can be demonstrated. Payback’s purpose is to put one serious, transparent, self-correcting proposal into the marketplace of ideas before fiscal pressure leaves the country with fewer choices and worse ones.

Selected current sources and project references

[1] Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2026 to 2036 (February 2026). https://www.cbo.gov/publication/62105

[2] Social Security and Medicare Boards of Trustees, 2026 Annual Reports – Summary. https://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TRSUM/

[3] Payback Project / AST, September 2026 Integrated Masters and Canonical Context – current Better-Way rule, National Tax Council role, replacement-before-repeal principle, taxpayer-rights constraints, and AST lifecycle architecture.

[4] Book III – The Ameri-Share Tax, September 2026 Integrated Conformed Edition – current EPI and productive-reinvestment lifecycle, owner-attributable business rules, lifetime recipient transfers, poverty protection, rate governance, and replacement rules.

[5] Ameri-Share Tax Calculator 3.0 v3.10.0 and current User Guide & Methodology – FY/TY2023 scenario and equal-revenue policy-comparison model.

[6] Internal Revenue Service, The Tax Gap – Tax Year 2022 projections. https://www.irs.gov/statistics/irs-the-tax-gap

[7] Joint Committee on Taxation, Overview of the Definition of Income Used by the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation in Distributional Analyses (JCX-15-12, February 8, 2012), together with the Joint Committee’s current Revenue Estimating description of expanded-income distributional analysis. https://www.jct.gov/publications/2012/jcx-15-12/ ; https://www.jct.gov/operations/revenue-estimating/

[8] Joint Committee on Taxation, Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2025-2029 (JCX-45-25, December 3, 2025), and Congressional Budget Office, Tax Expenditures (March 17, 2017) – tax preferences, base narrowing, and resource-allocation considerations. https://www.jct.gov/publications/2025/jcx-45-25/ ; https://www.cbo.gov/publication/52493

[9] Congressional Budget Office, How Reducing Payroll Taxes Can Encourage Employment (February 3, 2010), and Revisiting the Extent to Which Payroll Taxes Are Passed Through to Employees, Working Paper 2021-06 (June 2, 2021) – employment-cost effects and uncertainty concerning payroll-tax incidence. https://www.cbo.gov/publication/25028 ; https://www.cbo.gov/publication/57089

[10] Joint Committee on Taxation, Overview of the Federal Tax System as in Effect for 2025 (JCX-38-25, September 5, 2025), and General Explanation of the Tax Provisions of Public Law 119-21 (JCS-1-26, May 28, 2026) – current-law federal tax structure and later statutory changes. https://www.jct.gov/publications/2025/jcx-38-25/ ; https://www.jct.gov/publications/2026/jcs-1-26/

[11] Internal Revenue Service, Criminal Investigation, Fiscal Year 2025 Annual Report and related release (December 12, 2025) – approximately $4.5 billion in identified tax fraud in FY2025; detected criminal cases are not an estimate of total national tax fraud. https://www.irs.gov/compliance/criminal-investigation/irs-ci-issues-fiscal-year-2025-annual-report-showcasing-banner-investigative-results

[12] U.S. Office of Management and Budget / Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Federal Debt Held by the Public as Percent of GDP and Federal Surplus or Deficit as Percent of GDP. The 3.9 percent figure is the arithmetic average of annual fiscal-year deficits from FY1980 through FY2025. https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FYGFGDQ188S ; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FYFSDFYGDP

[13] U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index – August 2026; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, FOMC Statement (September 16, 2026); Federal Reserve H.15 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate. https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/cpi_09112026.htm ; https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20260916a.htm ; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DGS10

[14] Congressional Budget Office, The Distribution of Household Income, 2022 (January 21, 2026) – long-run distributional trends from 1979 through 2022. https://www.cbo.gov/publication/61911

[15] Economic Policy Institute, Elise Gould and Jori Kandra, “Wage Inequality Fell in 2023 Amid a Strong Labor Market, Bucking Long-Term Trends” (December 11, 2024), analysis of Social Security Administration wage statistics – 1979-2023 wage levels, growth rates, and wage shares. https://www.epi.org/blog/wage-inequality-fell-in-2023-amid-a-strong-labor-market-bucking-long-term-trends-but-top-1-wages-have-skyrocketed-182-since-1979-while-bottom-90-wages-have-seen-just-44-growth/

[16] Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Report on the Economic Well-Being of U.S. Households in 2025 (May 2026) – household budget pressure, unpaid bills, medical-care deferral, and effects of price changes. https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/2026-economic-well-being-of-us-households-in-2025-executive-summary.htm

[17] Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Distributional Financial Accounts, Distribution of Household Wealth in the U.S. since 1989, 2026:Q2 release (updated September 18, 2026) – wealth levels and shares by wealth percentile group. Top-1-percent figures in the text combine the Federal Reserve’s Top 0.1% and 99-99.9% groups. https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/dataviz/dfa/distribute/table/

[18] Samara Beach, William Gamber, and Patrick Moran, “Wealth Heterogeneity and Consumer Spending,” FEDS Notes, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (August 5, 2025) – heterogeneous consumption responses to wealth. https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/wealth-heterogeneity-and-consumer-spending-20250805.html

[19] Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income Bulletin, discussion of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 – reduction of the maximum individual ordinary-income tax rate from 70 percent to 50 percent. https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/86rpwinbul.pdf

[20] Congressional Budget Office, The Distribution of Household Income, 2018 (2021) – distributional effects of the 2017 tax act, including corporate and pass-through provisions. https://www.cbo.gov/publication/57404

[21] U.S. Department of the Treasury / Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Federal Debt Held by the Public (FYGFDPUN), and U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis / Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price Deflator (GDPDEF) – quarterly debt levels and the common price index used to express 1989:Q3 wealth and debt in 2026:Q1 dollars. https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FYGFDPUN ; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDPDEF

[22] Program for Public Consultation, University of Maryland School of Public Policy, National Common Ground survey (February 11-26, 2026) – 80 percent of U.S. adults surveyed favored a proposed annual wealth tax of 2 percent on wealth above $50 million and 3 percent above $1 billion. https://publicconsultation.org/cgoap/

Editorial note: Time-sensitive fiscal projections, trust-fund dates, statutory thresholds, administrative rules, tax-gap estimates, and project status should be refreshed immediately before final website publication.